Criminal Procedure 2016 by Le Roux-Kemp, Andra
JOBNAME: Annual−Survey 16 PAGE: 1 SESS: 405 OUTPUT: Wed May 30 13:20:44 2018
/first/Juta/juta/annual−survey16/00−prelims
ANNUAL SURVEY OF
SOUTH AFRICAN LAW
2016
JOBNAME: Annual−Survey 16 PAGE: 2 SESS: 405 OUTPUT: Wed May 30 13:20:44 2018
/first/Juta/juta/annual−survey16/00−prelims
JOBNAME: Annual−Survey 16 PAGE: 3 SESS: 405 OUTPUT: Wed May 30 13:20:44 2018
/first/Juta/juta/annual−survey16/00−prelims
Annual Survey
of
South African Law
2016
Published for
THE CENTRE FOR BUSINESS LAW
OF THE UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH AFRICA
PRETORIA
by
JOBNAME: Annual−Survey 16 PAGE: 4 SESS: 408 OUTPUT: Wed May 30 13:20:44 2018
/first/Juta/juta/annual−survey16/00−prelims
Published 2018
© Juta and Company (Pty) Ltd
First Floor, Sunclare Building, 21 Dreyer Street,
Claremont 7708
This book is copyright under the Berne Convention. In terms of
the Copyright Act, No 98 of 1978, no part of this book may be
reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means,
electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording or
by any information storage and retrieval system, without permis-
sion in writing from the publisher.
Whilst every effort has been made to ensure that the information
published in this work is accurate, the editors, publishers and
printers take no responsibility for any loss or damage suffered
by any person as a result of the information contained herein.
Typeset in 10 on 111⁄2 point Helvetica Light
ISBN 978 1 48512 085 8
ISSN 0376-4605
Typeset by Helanna Typesetting
Print Management by ???
JOBNAME: Annual−Survey 16 PAGE: 5 SESS: 405 OUTPUT: Wed May 30 13:20:44 2018
/first/Juta/juta/annual−survey16/00−prelims
This issue of the Annual Survey of South African Law is
dedicated with gratitude to Professor JT (Jopie) Pretorius
Professor Joseph Thomas Pretorius retired from the University of
South Africa and from Annual Survey at the end of 2017 after an
illustrious career with the journal spanning some 32 years.
Starting as a contributor in 1985, Jopie has throughout been a
driving force behind the continuity and success of Annual Survey.
Apart from authoring the Chapters Negotiable Instruments and
Miscellaneous Contracts, he served on, and since 2007 chaired,
the Editorial Board. As Chair of the Board, Jopie brought his
encyclopaedic knowledge of who’s who in South African law to
bear in drawing together the formidable pool of expertise which
has over the years promoted and maintained the journal’s status
as one of the leading and most authoritative legal sources in the
country. His wisdom in handling the inevitable problems, and the
years of experience that he applied diplomatically in dealing with
academic authors have proven invaluable. He also played a
pivotal and visionary role in mentoring and developing the talent
of several young editors. South African academia and practice
alike owe Professor Pretorius a deep debt of gratitude for his
contribution to law in our country. We are very pleased to
announce that he has agreed to continue serving on Annual
Survey’s Editorial Board.
As the editors of Annual Survey of South African Law, we wish
Jopie every happiness in his retirement, and every success in his
future endeavours, academic and otherwise. May the call of
Wakkerstroom never fade, and may you, Bella, and your children
spend many happy hours wandering the hills.
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And so, with a nod to Leonard Cohen, we must regretfully say:
Now so-long [Jopie-man] it’s time that [you] began to laugh, and
cry, and cry, and laugh, about it all again . . .
Leonard Cohen ‘‘So long Marianne’’ (Project Seven Music 1966)
Neville Botha, Judith Geldenhuys, Jeannie Van Wyk, and
Christian Schulze
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PUBLICATION ETHICS AND PUBLICATION MALPRACTICE
STATEMENT
ETHICAL GUIDELINES FOR JOURNAL PUBLICATION
The publication of the peer-reviewed journal Annual Survey of
South African Law contributes to the growth of knowledge.
Therefore, all participants – authors, editors, peer reviewers, and
the publisher – agree on standards of proper ethical behaviour.
The University of South Africa and Juta and Co Ltd, who are
respectively responsible for producing and publishing the jour-
nal, recognise the ethical and other responsibilities and take our
guardianship of the functions connected with the publication of
the journal very seriously.
DUTIES OF AUTHORS
The authors undertake to present an accurate and current
account of legislative and judicial developments and to provide
objective discussion. The material must contain sufficient detail
and permit others to replicate the work. Making fraudulent or
knowingly inaccurate statements is unacceptable. Work reflect-
ing editorial opinion must be acknowledged as such.
The work must be original, and where the work/words of others
have been used this must be appropriately quoted or cited.
Plagiarism in any form is unethical behaviour, and unacceptable.
Authors are not permitted, in general, to publish manuscripts.
Submitting the same manuscript to more than one journal for
publication is unethical and unacceptable, save in exceptional
circumstances where the authors have sought approval from the
editor for publication of the same material in a secondary
publication; in this case, the primary reference must be cited in
the secondary publication.
If an author discovers that his or her published work contains
an inaccuracy, he or she must promptly notify the editor, and
cooperate with the editor to excise or correct the content. If the
editor is informed of an inaccuracy by a third party, the author
must promptly retract or correct the manuscript, or prove that the
original content is correct.
DUTIES OF EDITORS
The editors of the Annual Survey of South African Law are
responsible for deciding whether chapters submitted for publica-
ix
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tion should be accepted. They may be guided by policies of the
editorial board. The editor-in-chief may confer with the other
editors in making a final determination.
The editors must ensure that contributions to the journal appear
in correct English which complies with the style guidelines
prescribed for the journal. The editors evaluate the intellectual
content of manuscripts without regard to gender, race, religious
belief, sexual orientation, citizenship, ethnic origin or the political
inclinations of the authors.
The editorial board will not disclose any information about
chapters submitted for publication to anyone other than the
corresponding author, reviewers, and the publisher as appro-
priate.
Unpublished material submitted by authors may not be used in
the editor’s own research without consent from the author. Editors
must disclose competing interests and publish corrections if the
conflicts of interest are discovered after publication. If required,
other action must be taken, such as retraction of the manuscript
and expression of concern.
The editors take responsibility to respond to ethical complaints
concerning a submitted manuscript or chapter published in the
Annual Survey of South African Law. Any reported complaint,
even if submitted years after publication, will be investigated and
appropriate measures will be taken.
DUTIES OF REVIEWERS
The objective peer review process assists the editor-in-chief in
making editorial decisions, and in improving the quality of the
chapters. Peer review is a key component of scholarly communi-
cation and ensures sound standards of research and proper
acknowledgment of sources used.
Unpublished materials contained in an unpublished manu-
script may not be used in the reviewer’s own research without the
consent of the author. Reviewers must disclose any possible
conflict of interests that may exist, and recuse themselves from
reviews in instances where such a conflict exists.
x ANNUAL SURVEY OF SA LAW
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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
ANDRA LE ROUX-KEMP*
LEGISLATION
CRIMINAL MATTERS AMENDMENT ACT 18 OF 2015
The Criminal Matters Amendment Act 18 of 2015 was pub-
lished in Government Gazette 39522 of 15 December 2015 and
aims to amend and regulate miscellaneous matters relating to
essential infrastructure-related offences. Essential infrastructure
is defined in section 1 of the Amendment Act as ‘any installation,
structure, facility or system, whether publicly or privately owned,
the loss or damage of, or the tampering with, which may interfere
with the provision or distribution of a basic service to the public’.
The Act came into operation on 1 June 2016 (Proc R33 in
GG 40010 of 24 May 2016).
CASE LAW
DUTIES OF JUDICIAL OFFICERS
It is the duty of all judicial officers to ensure that there is no
irregularity or illegality in the proceedings over which they
preside, and that all formalities, rules, and principles of proce-
dure with which the law requires such a trial to be initiated and
conducted, are adhered to (S v Fethum 1991 (1) SACR 461 486 ).
The right of an accused to a fair trial
Judge Goldstone in S v Radebe; S v Mbonani 1988 (1) SA191 (T)
said the following about the general duty on the part of judicial
officers to ensure that unrepresented accused fully understand
their rights (196F-I):
If there is a duty upon judicial officers to inform unrepresented
accused of their legal rights, then I can conceive of no reason why the
right to legal representation should not be one of them. Especially
where the charge is a serious one which may merit a sentence which
* BALLB (Stell) CML (UNISA) LLD (Stell) BMus (UNISA)Hons BMus (UNISA).
Assistant Professor at the School of Law, City University of Hong Kong, Visiting
Research Scholar at the School of Law, University of theWitwatersrand.
309
JOBNAME: Annual−Survey 16 PAGE: 2 SESS: 9 OUTPUT: Wed May 30 13:20:44 2018
/first/Juta/juta/annual−survey16/ch10
could be materially prejudicial to the accused, such an accused
should be informed of the seriousness of the charge and the possible
consequences of a conviction. Again, depending upon the complexity
of the charge, or of the legal rules relating thereto, and the seriousness
thereof, an accused should not only be told of this right but he should
be encouraged to exercise it. He should be given a reasonable time
within which to do so. He should be informed in appropriate cases that
he is entitled to apply to the Legal Aid Board for assistance. A failure
on the part of a judicial officer to do this, having regard to the
circumstances of a particular case, may result in an unfair trial in
which there may well be a complete failure of justice. I should make it
clear that I am not suggesting that the absence of legal representation
per se or the absence of the suggested advice to an accused person
per se will necessarily result in such an irregularity or an unfair trial and
the failure of justice. Each case will depend upon its own facts and
peculiar circumstances.
This important duty of judicial officers to inform accused of their
legal rights, including their right to legal representation, was
considered in S v Mafika 2016 (1) SACR 623 (FB). The accused in
this matter did not agree with one of the charges brought against
him and refused to give his legal representative instructions in
this regard. His legal representative subsequently withdrew due
to lack of proper instructions. The presiding magistrate insisted,
however, that all charges be put to the accused and despite the
accused’s objections, also instructed the prosecutor to proceed
with the case (paras [1]-[3]). The reason for the trial magistrate
adopting this stance as indicated on the court record, was that
the accused had a problem with the charges against him and not
with his legal representative. Another legal representative would,
therefore, in the opinion of the magistrate, not have made a
difference (para [3]).
Throughout the ensuing trial, the accused requested legal
representation and indicated that he was not in a position to
defend himself, to cross-examine witnesses, and to present his
case. The magistrate refused these requests, and while the
magistrate explained to the accused his rights of cross-examina-
tion after the testimony of each witness for the state, the magis-
trate merely noted on the record that the accused had not
responded to these explanations (paras [4] [5]). Judge Ebrahim,
writing for the majority of the High Court Free State Division,
Bloemfontein, described this as ‘an arrogance on the part of the
presiding magistrate vis-à-vis the accused as well as an authori-
tarian stance in taking a summary decision not to afford the
accused any opportunity to obtain legal assistance’ (para [7]).
310 ANNUAL SURVEY OF SA LAW (2016)
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The judge noted that not even the accused’s direct appeal to the
presiding magistrate’s
apparent sense of fair play, by repeatedly alluding to his lack of legal
expertise and his feeling of impotence in the conduct of his defence
on his own without the assistance of a lawyer, as well as his need for a
lawyer to bring proper legal skills to bear in the presentation of his
case had any effect whatsoever in jolting the magistrate out of his
state of anaesthesia as regards the accused’s fundamental right to be
legally represented (para [9.2]).
The failure of the trial magistrate to ensure the accused his
fundamental right to a fair trial, and particularly his right to legal
representation, was found to constitute a gross irregularity result-
ing in a failure of justice. The conviction was consequently set
aside and the matter remitted back to the magistrate’s court for a
trial de novo before a different magistrate (para [11]).
The duty of a court during bail proceedings
In S v Mathonsi 2016 (1) SACR 417 (GP), Judge Makhafola for
the Gauteng Division, Pretoria, emphasised that it is the duty of a
court to guide the parties in following the correct procedure
during a bail hearing. Bail hearings are furthermore sui generis
and inquisitorial in nature and a court must, therefore, take an
active role in ensuring that a just decision is made with regard to
an accused’s right to freedom pending a trial (para [8]).
In this matter, the appellant appeared twice before the magis-
trate for consideration for release on bail. The first bail application
was refused – as was the second, despite its being based on new
facts and evidence (para [3]). In the second bail application, both
the appellant’s attorney and the prosecution merely addressed
the court on the new facts without presenting the court with viva
voce evidence and/or affidavits (para [16]). On appeal against
the second decision to refuse bail, it was held that the presiding
officer should have taken control of the proceedings where the
defence and the prosecution were lacking, by, for example,
inviting the appellant to present evidence in support of the new
facts (para [21]). Having found that the magistrate’s court had
failed to execute its duties in this regard, the second decision not
to grant the appellant bail was set aside (para [29]).
Referral of cases to the High Court and responding to enquiries by the
High Court
The accused in S v Tshabalala (case 102/2015 [2016] ZAFSHC
90, 5 May 2016) was convicted of theft after a plea of guilty in
311CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
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terms of section 112(1)(a) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of
1977 and sentenced to a fine of R1 500, or in default of payment,
three months’ imprisonment. It was also determined that the
accused was fit to possess a firearm in terms of section 103(2) of
the Firearms Control Act 60 of 2000. The matter was subse-
quently sent on review to the High Court Free State Division,
Bloemfontein, as on conviction of the accused under section
112(1)(a) the prosecutor proceeded to prove previous convic-
tions against the accused and asked that a term of direct
imprisonment be imposed. This is, however, not possible under
section 112(1)(a), which can only be relied upon where the
conviction is of a trivial nature warranting a sentence other than
imprisonment (para [19]). While there was, therefore, a clear error
of law in this case, the discussion here will rather focus on the
administration of the matter in terms of its referral to the High
Court for review.
The conviction and sentence were handed down on 26 January
2015, but the High Court received them only on 10 June 2015
(paras [1] [2]). The High Court thereupon sent the review,
together with queries, back to the magistrate on 19 June 2015,
and this request was apparently only received by the magistrate
on 29 August 2015 (para [3]). On 20 October 2015, the High
Court received a reply to its queries dated 9 October 2015. In
addition to this protracted correspondence, the High Court also
noted that the initial review was referred in terms of section 303 of
the Criminal Procedure Act and, in the response to queries raised
by the High Court, it was indicated that the matter was being
referred as a special review in terms of section 304(4) of the Act
(para [4]).
Mocumie J and Opperman AJ for the Bloemfontein High Court,
observed that there are no guidelines in magistrates’ courts
across the country on the administration of a referral of review
cases by a magistrate’s court to the High Court (para [6]). The
practice is for a magistrate to alert the Chief Magistrate, Senior
Magistrate, Quality Assurance Officer, or a magistrate based at a
station where he or she serves as the head of office, of a mistake
or oversight that can only be corrected by a High Court. The case
is then referred by the designated official by way of a covering
letter identifying the problem and proposing a remedy or seeking
direction or guidance on how the matter should be dealt with. It is
important, however, that this covering letter is written by the
designated official at that magistrate’s court and not the magis-
trate responsible for the mistake or oversight (para [7]).
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Where a matter has been sent on review to the High Court, and
that court requests a magistrate to furnish reasons for a convic-
tion or sentence, that request should be regarded as ‘one of an
extremely urgent nature’ (para [11]), and the clerk of the court is
likewise duty bound to comply with the provisions of section 303
of the Criminal Procedure Act which require that
[t]he clerk of the court in question shall within one week after the
determination of a case referred to in paragraph (a) of section 302(1)
forward to the registrar of the provincial or local division having
jurisdiction the record of the proceedings in the case or a copy thereof
certified by such clerk, together with such remarks as the presiding
judicial officer may wish to append thereto, and with any written
statement or argument which the person convicted may within three
days after imposition of the sentence furnish to the clerk of the court,
and such registrar shall, as soon as possible, lay the same in
chambers before a judge of that division for his consideration.
Although the Criminal Procedure Act does not explicitly attach
any consequences to non-compliance, any delay has the poten-
tial of causing the accused prejudice and can result in ‘an
irreversible collapse of justice’ (para [12]).
In S v Nyumbeka 2012 (2) SACR 367 (WCC), the full bench of
the Western Cape High Court reiterated the role of a magistrate
when imposing a reviewable sentence as follows (paras [21] [22]):
[21] When imposing a reviewable sentence, magistrates should
check:
(i) that it had been entered into the review register;
(ii) that the full record had been properly typed, where it had been
handwritten, and transcribed, where there was a mechanical
recording of the proceedings;
(iii) that all the evidence presented at the trial is included and, where
it is not available, try and reconstruct such evidence from the
handwritten notes, with the assistance of all the parties con-
cerned;
(iv) that all documents and annexures are attached to the record;
(v) that no incomplete or incorrect record is sent on review, because
this would lead to delays, . . . Should this happen, the magistrate
would be clearly negligent in executing his/her duties and func-
tions imposed by the law, especially section 303 of the Criminal
Procedure Act 51 of 1977.
[22] Whilst the preparation of a record for a review and an appeal is
primarily a function of the clerk of the court, it is ultimately the function
of the magistrate to see to it that a proper record is sent to the high
court. The clerk of the court, unlike the one in this case, should see to it
that this is done timeously and within the periods prescribed by law,
313CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
JOBNAME: Annual−Survey 16 PAGE: 6 SESS: 9 OUTPUT: Wed May 30 13:20:44 2018
/first/Juta/juta/annual−survey16/ch10
and should follow up after having checked the register, as to why
reviews are delayed. . . .
Appointing assessors
Section 93ter(1) of the Magistrates’ Court Act 32 of 1944
provides a magistrate to summons any one or two persons who,
in his or her opinion, may be of assistance at the trial or in the
determination of an appropriate sentence. Where assessors are
appointed to assist a magistrate at trial, the appointment must be
made before any evidence has been led, and where the asses-
sors are appointed to assist in sentencing, mention is specifically
made of the consideration of community-based punishment. The
appointment of assessors by a magistrate is, therefore, a matter
which falls within the discretion of the magistrate, and this
discretion must be exercised on the basis of what the magistrate
deems expedient for the administration of justice. However,
where an accused stands trial in a regional court on a charge of
murder – whether together with other charges or not – the
presiding magistrate must be assisted at trial by two assessors,
unless the accused explicitly requests that the trial proceed
without assessors, and even then, the presiding magistrate may
still exercise a discretion and appoint one or two assessors.
The accused in Gayiya v S 2016 (2) SACR 165 (SCA) was
arraigned in a regional court on five charges, the first being
kidnapping, the second a charge of assault with intent to cause
grievous bodily harm, and the final three charges of murder. The
accused pleaded guilty to counts one and three, but not guilty to
counts two, four and five (para [1]). The magistrate returned a
guilty verdict on counts one and three and proceeded to question
the accused with regard to the remaining charges in terms of
section 115 of the Criminal Procedure Act. In answering these
questions, the accused made certain admissions which were
recorded in terms of section 220 of the Act. The state then closed
its case without leading further evidence and the accused also
closed his case, despite the explanation offered by the regional
magistrate that the exculpatory parts of his plea explanation were
not evidence in his favour, and that he had to testify under oath if
he wished them to have any evidential value. The accused was
subsequently also convicted on counts two, four, and five on the
strength of the formal admissions recorded in terms of section
220 of the Criminal Procedure Act (para [2]). It was only after the
accused and the prosecution had addressed the court on
314 ANNUAL SURVEY OF SA LAW (2016)
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sentence, and the regional magistrate had committed the accused
for sentence to the High Court in terms of section 52(a)(i) of the
Criminal Procedure Act, that the regional magistrate informed the
accused of his right to have assessors appointed (para [4]). The
accused hereupon indicated that he did not need assessors at
the trial, but wanted assessors present at the sentencing stage
(para [4]).
The magistrate’s court which had tried and convicted the
accused in Gayiya v S 2016 (2) SACR 165 (SCA) had, therefore,
not been properly constituted in that the peremptory provisions of
section 93ter(1) of the Magistrates’ Court Act 32 of 1944 had not
been met. The regional magistrate in this case should have
informed the accused of his right to have two assessors present
at trial before the commencement of the trial and, furthermore, the
law requires that the magistrate be assisted by two assessors in a
murder trial before a regional court, unless the accused requests
that the matter proceed without assessors (para [8]). This defect
cannot be waived by an accused ex post facto (para [11]). The
convictions and sentences were consequently set aside (para
[12]).
Also see S v Nhlapo 2016 (1) SACR 489 (GP) where it was held
that the failure to appoint assessors is a gross irregularity (para
[10]; and S v Mokalaka 2010 (1) SACR 88 (GNP); S v Naicker
2008 (2) SACR 54 (N)).
Discharging an accused in terms of section 174 of the Criminal Procedure
Act 51 of 1977
The respondents in S v Moreroa (case A523/2015 [2016]
ZAGPPHC 30, 22 January 2016) were charged with one count of
corruption and three counts of having contravened section
6(a)–(c) of the Prevention of Organised Crime Act 121 of 1998. At
the end of the state’s case, the respondents applied for, and were
granted, a discharge in terms of section 174 of the Criminal
Procedure Act. Appealing this decision, the appellants argued
that the magistrate had applied the incorrect test in deciding to
order their discharge. They submitted that the correct test is
whether a reasonable presiding officer could have convicted on
the evidence which had been placed before him (para [11]).
Judge Jansen for the Gauteng Division of the High Court,
Pretoria, held that the correct interpretation of section 174 of the
Criminal ProcedureAct was laid down in R v Shein 1925AD 6 and
has applied ever since. This interpretation requires that a court
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order the discharge of an accused where it is of the view that
there is no evidence of his or her having committed the offence in
the charge sheet or any other offence which may arise in terms of
a competent verdict (paras [50] [51]).
In another case, S v M (case 2/2016 [2016] ZAFSHC 41,
18 March 2016), the two accused were charged with rape,
robbery with aggravating circumstances as defined in section 1
of the Criminal Procedure Act, and two counts of housebreaking
with the intent to contravene provisions of section 3 of the
Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related Matters) Amendment
Act 32 of 2007. The accused pleaded not guilty to all the charges
and at the close of the state’s case, brought an application for
discharge in terms of section 174 of the Criminal Procedure Act
(para [5]). The prosecution did not oppose the application with
regard to accused 1, but argued that the evidence against
accused 2 did not allow for a discharge (para [6]).
Section 174 of the Criminal Procedure Act provides for an
accused to be discharged at the close of the prosecution’s case,
if the court is of the opinion that there is no evidence that he or she
committed the offence referred to in the charge, or any other
offence of which he or she may be convicted in terms of the
charge. In such circumstances, a court may return a verdict of
not guilty (para [9]). This requires that the court evaluate the
evidence at the close of the prosecution’s case differently from
how that evidence would be evaluated at the end of a trial. This is
because a discharge in terms of section 174 of the Criminal
Procedure Act is a sui generis interlocutory procedure – ie, a
question of law and not of fact – and it is also for this reason that
assessors are prohibited from participating in rulings in terms of
section 174 (para [10]).
The test to determine whether there is indeed no evidence
upon which a reasonable court acting carefully would convict,
was articulated in S v Shuping & others 1983 (2) SA 119 (B): ‘The
first consideration is whether there is evidence on which a
reasonable person may convict. If the answer is ‘‘yes’’, a dis-
charge should be refused. If the answer is ‘‘no’’, it must be asked
whether there is a reasonable possibility that the defence evi-
dence might supplement the state’s case’ (para [11]). With
regard to the second leg of the test, it was further held in S v
Lubaxa 2001 (2) SACR 703 (SCA) that a minimum of evidence
was required for a person to be convicted. In the absence of such
a minimum of evidence, a person ought not to be prosecuted
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merely on the expectation that at some stage he or she might
incriminate him- or herself, or supplement the state’s case (para
[12]).
However, this minimum of evidence cannot be equated with a
standard of proof – ie, whether it is beyond a reasonable doubt or
on a balance of probabilities. The test is, as indicated above, sui
generis and must be applied with judicial discretion in light of
the specific facts and circumstances of each case. Judge
Opperman for the Free State High Court, Bloemfontein in S v M
(case 2/2016 [2016] ZAFSHC 41, 18 March 2016), describes this
test as ‘a combination of the first leg of the Shuping-case, the
dictum in the Lubaxa-case and the principles of a fair trial in
terms of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (1996)’
(para [16]). Further, in applying the provisions of section 174, the
following considerations must be taken into account as per S v
Gqozo (2) 1994 (1) BCLR 10 (Ck) (S v M above para [16]):
1. An innocent person must as far as possible never be convicted of
a crime.
2. The conviction of a guilty person must be obtained with the best
possible endeavours. The prosecution representing the commu-
nity must fulfil their duties within the framework of the law and the
available facts.
3. The right to remain silent and the satisfaction of the responsibility
which is on the State must be satisfied as far as possible.
4. The rights of the accused are very important.
5. The right of the community to see that justice is done is equally
important.
6. To achieve these goals instruments should be used in such a way
that justice is done to everybody.
With regard to whether the credibility of state witnesses ought
to be taken into consideration in deciding whether to grant a
discharge, it was held that this should play only a limited role, and
that the evidence should be ignored only if it was of such poor
quality that no reasonable person could possibly accept it (para
[20]).
In considering the applications for discharge of the two accused
on these considerations and the test as described above, the
court concluded that it would indeed be unconstitutional to put
the first accused on his defence in light of the poor quality of the
evidence against him, but that the second accused was to stand
trial as his version of the events lacked detail, was vague and
general, and there was little possibility, given his defence, that he
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would advance the state’s case if the case were to continue and
he were to enter the witness box (para [25]).
Duty to assist an unrepresented accused with cross-examination
The duty of a trial judge to assist an unrepresented accused
with cross-examination was emphasised in Crowther v S (case
A458/2015 [2016] ZAWCHC 32, 11 March 2016). The appellant in
this case was convicted on one count of theft and sentenced to
three years’ imprisonment. Throughout his trial, the appellant was
unrepresented and on appeal, he argued that the magistrate had
failed in his duty to assist him (the appellant) with cross-
examining the state witnesses, and that this ultimately resulted in
the violation of his right to a fair trial. It was also submitted that the
magistrate had misdirected himself in finding that the state had
proved all the elements of the offence, and that the appellant’s
version could not reasonably possibly be true (paras [1] [2]).
The additional burden placed on a presiding officer in hearing
a matter in which the accused is without legal representation, was
remarked on as follows in S v Sebatana 1983 (1) SA 809 (O):
The presiding officer . . . has a duty to assist the accused in
presenting his defence by way of cross-examination by, for example,
expressly asking him whether he agrees with each material allegation
made against him by a State witness. In this way, it should in most
instances rapidly become clear which evidence is disputed, and the
presiding officer can himself put the necessary question or contention
to the State witness. This would at least give the accused the
impression that he is being fairly treated during the trial (S v Sebatana
1983 (1) SA 809 (O) 810; S v Rudman; S v Johnson; S v Xaso; Xaso v
Van Wyk NO & another 1989 (3) SA 368 (E)).
In S v Lekhetho 2002 (2) SACR 13 (O), it was held that mere lip
service to the duty to explain his procedural rights to the accused
is not enough, and ‘[t]he right to cross-examine is one such
important right. Failure to explain it and to assist the unrepre-
sented accused when necessary in its exercise is an irregularity’
(S v Lekhetho paras [10] [11]).
In Crowther v S, the presiding magistrate did not explain the
purpose of cross-examination to the appellant, or how he should
conduct such cross-examination, nor did the magistrate assist
the accused in presenting his cross-examination in a meaningful
way (para [9]). Furthemore, the prosecution’s cross-examination
of the appellant centred on reasons why the appellant had not
disputed the evidence of other witnesses. It was held that it was
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unfair where an undefended accused’s failure to cross-examine
properly was due to the absence of any assistance by the court
(para [10]). The appellant also had not received the complain-
ant’s witness statements before the commencement of the trial, a
fact which emerged only after the complainant had given her
testimony (para [11]). The court therefore found that a substantial
injustice in this matter had prejudiced the appellant’s case and
vitiated the entire proceedings. The conviction and sentence
were set aside (paras [14] [15]).
‘BENEFIT’ IN TERMS OF THE PREVENTION OF ORGANISED CRIME ACT
121 OF 1998 (POCA)
The correct interpretation of the word ‘benefit’ in section 18(1)
of the POCA was at issue in National Director of Public Prosecu-
tions v Ramlutchman 2016 (1) SACR 362 (KZP). The respondent
benefited from the fraudulent misrepresentations and corruption
relating to a contract for building schools and argued that
‘benefit’ in this instance could not be the proceeds of the
contract, but, at most, would amount to the profit after deducting
the costs of construction from the contract price (para [2]). The
appellant, in turn, had failed to discharge the onus of proving
the amount of the benefit in the court a quo, and submitted that
the ‘benefit’ in this case was equivalent to the ‘proceeds of
unlawful activities’ which equalled the amount of the proceeds
of the contract for building schools. The court consequently had
to decide whether ‘proceeds of unlawful activities’ equalled
everything ‘received’, and whether everything ‘received’ was
equal to ‘benefit’, and further, whether ‘benefit’ equalled ‘pro-
ceeds’ or ‘gains’ (para [2]).
Chapter 5 of the POCA is titled ‘Proceeds of unlawful activities’
and provides, inter alia, that no person should benefit from the
fruits of unlawful activities. It also grants the state a civil remedy of
preservation, seizure, and forfeiture of property derived from
unlawful activities and the various offences created in terms of
the Act. ‘Proceeds of unlawful activities’ is defined in section 1 of
the POCA as ‘any property or any service advantage, benefit or
reward which was derived, received or retained, directly or
indirectly, in the Republic or elsewhere, at any time before or after
the commencement of this Act, in connection with or as a result of
any unlawful activity carried on by any person, and includes any
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property representing property so derived.’ Section 18(1)(a) of
the POCA further empowers a court to enquire into any benefit an
offender convicted of an offence in terms of the Act may have
derived from that offence, and to make an order against the
offender for payment to the state of any amount it considers
appropriate. The jurisdictional prerequisites for invoking the
confiscation of property in terms of Chapter 5 of the POCA are:
the person must be convicted of an offence; must have benefited
from the fruits of that offence; and the benefit must have been
derived, received, or retained (para [10]). Establishing whether
these jurisdictional prerequisites exist in a case is a factual
enquiry and is not dependent on the discretion of a court (para
[15]).
This interpretation of the concept ‘benefit’, however, was
described by Pillay J for the High Court KwaZulu-Natal Division,
Pietermaritzburg, as purposive in nature and the judge clearly
rejected a black-letter law approach (para [11]). Pillay J also
emphasised that the ‘variety of factual circumstances in which
the Chapter 5 may arise for consideration would resist an
inflexible approach’, and it is, therefore, not possible to ‘straight-
jacket’ the concept ‘benefit’ to mean only the ‘proceeds of
unlawful activities’ (para [11]). The concept ‘benefit’ was first
considered by the Constitutional Court in S v Shaik & others 2008
(2) SACR 165 (CC). In this case, the court rejected a narrow
interpretation of the word ‘benefit’ and unanimously pronounced
as follows (S v Shaik above para [60]):
[Section] 12(3) provides that a person will have benefited from
unlawful activities if he or she has received or retained any proceed of
unlawful activities. What constitutes a benefit, therefore, is defined by
reference to what constitutes ‘proceeds of unlawful activities’. It is not
possible in the light of this definition to give a narrower meaning to the
concept of benefit in s 18, for that concept is based on the definition of
the ‘proceeds of unlawful activities’ . . . ‘Proceeds’ is broadly defined
to include any property, advantage or reward derived, received or
retained directly or indirectly in connection with or as a result of any
unlawful activity . . . [section] 18(2) expressly contemplates that a
confiscation order may be made in respect of any property that falls
within the broader definition, and is not limited to a net amount.
With regard to how ‘benefit’ should be determined, a three-
stage process was suggested in National Director of Public
Prosecutions v Gardener 2011 (1) SACR 612 (SCA) paragraphs
[17] [18]. First, it must be established that the offender had
benefited from the offence for which he or she has been
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convicted. Then the value of the benefit must be determined, and
finally, the amount of the benefit recoverable from the defendant
must be considered. Given the extraordinary breadth and scope
of Chapter 5 of the POCA, courts must also ensure that any
confiscation order complies with the Constitution of the Republic
of South Africa, 1996, and that equity, fairness and proportionality
guide the court’s exercise of its discretion in making a finding in
terms of the provisions of this Act (National Director of Public
Prosecutions v Ramlutchman 2016 (1) SACR 362 (KZP) para [8]).
In exercising this discretion, courts should also consider the
following:
• In considering proportionality, courts must recognise the
fundamental differences between confiscation of benefits of
crime in terms of Chapter 5 of the POCA, which deals with the
unlawful proceeds of crime, and the forfeiture procedures of
Chapter 6 of the POCA, which deals with property used as an
instrumentality of an offence (para [18]).
• Courts should also guard against differentiating between
serious and less serious offences as any ‘interpretation that
permits some offenders to retain the benefits of their unlawful
activity whilst others are compelled by confiscation orders to
relinquish their ill-gotten gains is manifestly unjust, irrational,
and discriminatory’ (para [19]).
• The purpose of section 18(1) of the POCA is furthermore not to
punish, but rather to deprive an offender of any benefit that he
or she may have derived from the offence (para [20]). It is
therefore important not to conflate an offender’s sentence with
the granting of a confiscation order. These are two separate
enquiries: ‘the impact of the crime on the victim [for example]
is irrelevant to the computation of the benefit’ derived by the
offender from the offence (para [23]).
On the facts of the case under discussion, it was, therefore,
held that ‘[o]n a purely factual and common sense approach the
entire amount received as the proceeds of unlawful activities
cannot be a benefit if it is not exclusively a gain or profit’ (para
[33]). Thus, the cost of the construction component of the
proceeds in this matter could not be equated with gain or benefit,
and the appellant’s ‘all-or-nothing’ argument, if it succeeded,
would result in an unjustified enrichment at the expense of the
respondent (para [33]). The respondent paying more than the
amount by which he had actually benefited, is also prohibited in
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terms of section 18(2)(a) of the POCA. The appeal was conse-
quently dismissed (para [34]; also see National Director of Public
Prosecutions v Mtungwa 2006 (1) SACR 122 (N)).
PLEAS
Key to how a criminal proceeding progresses is the plea that
the accused (and his or her co-accused) elects to enter in answer
to the charges or counts laid by the prosecution. Section 106 of
the Criminal Procedure Act lists all the possible pleas available to
an accused. In the discussion below, relevant case law dealing
with a guilty plea, as well a procedural matter relating to the
consequences of having entered a plea, are considered.
Section 106 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977
In S v Fongoga & others 2016 (1) SACR 88 (WCC), the
appellants were asked to plead to two charges of rape but were
ultimately convicted of only one count of rape. Therefore, while
the appellants were asked to plead to two charges, a verdict was
delivered on only one of those charges (paras [62] [63]). In this
regard, section 106(4) of the Criminal Procedure Act specifically
provides that where an accused is asked to plead to a charge –
save for a limited number of exceptions – the accused will be
entitled to demand that he or she be acquitted or convicted on
that charge for which a plea had been entered. Thus, in correct-
ing the error, and with due regard to section 106(4) of the Criminal
Procedure Act, the appellants in S v Fongoga & others 2016 (1)
SACR 88 (WCC) were acquitted on the other charge of rape on
which the court a quo had not handed down a verdict (para [66];
S v Sithole & others 1999 (1) SACR 227 (T)).
In S v Masilo (case 15/2016 [2016] ZAFSHC 23, 11 February
2016), Moloi J confirmed that the withdrawal of a charge in terms
of section 106(4) of the Criminal Procedure Act, after an accused
has pleaded or a plea has been entered on his or her behalf,
does not bring the matter to a close, as such an accused is
entitled to a verdict once a plea has been entered (para [4]; S v
Sibuyi 1993 (1) SACR 235 (A)). In this matter, the withdrawal of
the charges against the accused was consequently set aside
(para [6]).
Section 112 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977
In Dube v S (case A532/15 [2016] ZAGPPHC 302, 29 April
2016), Thulare AJ for the High Court Gauteng Division, Pretoria,
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held that where an irregularity occurred with regard to the
entering of a plea of guilty, the subsequent determination of
whether there had been a failure of justice as a result of this
irregularity, simply requires that the court consider ‘on the evi-
dence unaffected by the irregularity or defect . . . [whether] there
was proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt’ (para [14]).
The appellant in this case was convicted of having unlawfully
and intentionally committed an act of sexual penetration with a
person under the age of sixteen years in contravention of section
3 of the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related Matters)
Amendment Act 32 of 2007. After the charge had been put to the
appellant, he answered as follows: ‘I dispute the rape but I did
have sex with her’ (para [4]). The appellant, therefore, admitted to
having had sexual intercourse with the complainant, but did not
understand that due to her age and despite the issue of consent,
this was a criminal offence. The appellant’s legal representative
again explained the charge to him, indicating to the court that the
appellant had misunderstood the charge. The charge was again
put to the appellant and he then proceeded to plead guilty (para
[4]). The legal representative indicated that this plea was in
accordance with her instructions, and she proceeded to read into
the record a statement prepared in terms of section 122(2) of the
Criminal Procedure Act in which the appellant admitted to all the
elements of the offence charged (para [5]). This statement was
signed by both the appellant and his legal representative and
was also confirmed by the appellant in court (paras [5] [6]).
However, during an interview with a probation officer for the
purpose of sentencing, the appellant indicated that he had
consensual sexual intercourse with the complainant, and that he
had no intention of raping her and had never intended to plead
guilty to the charge, but that his legal representative had forced
him to do so (para [9]). His legal representative consequently
withdrew as attorney of record and a legal representative from
Legal Aid South Africa was appointed for the appellant (para
[10]). At his next appearance in court, the appellant’s new legal
representative apologised on behalf of the appellant, and
explained that there had been a misunderstanding and that the
appellant indeed understood and pleaded guilty to the charge
(para [10]).
Thulare AJ for the High Court Gauteng Division, Pretoria, noted
that the appellant – who was 36 years of age – had, from the
moment the charge was put to him, admitted to sexual inter-
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course with the child under the age of sixteen years (para [12]).
Of the difficulties legal practitioners experience in practice, the
judge commented as follows:
[13] The court bears in mind the difficulties experienced by legal
practitioners in making sure that their clients understand the existing
and applicable legal position in a cause, especially when such clients
are lay persons, more so when they are illiterate or semi-illiterate.
Statutory provisions add to the difficulties of untangling this reality.
When the language barrier is added to the equation, the task is one of
the most challenging. Added to this, is the nature of the agency of a
legal practitioner, who is first and foremost approached for his or her
training, skill and competency to guide the presentation of a case
before a court of law. It must be borne in mind that it is the role of the
attorney to advise his client.
ThulareAJ concluded that ‘[a] lay person’s view by a client on a
technical matter, differing from that of a legally trained mind of his
legal representative, cannot amount to an irregularity, where the
client, after the nature and import of the presentation is discussed
with him, confirms in open court to the magistrate that what is
presented are his instructions’ (para [14]).
In another case, Sephula v S (case A139/2015 [2016] ZAFSHC
31, 11 February 2016), the appellant was convicted on a charge
of rape and sentenced to life imprisonment. On appeal, it was
argued on behalf of the appellant that his previous legal counsel
had not been mandated to change his plea from not guilty to
guilty in the court a quo after the state had presented all its
evidence and just before the state prosecutor delivered his
closing address (paras [4] [5]). It was also submitted that it had
been a material misdirection by the trial court not to have
confirmed whether the appellant had indeed instructed his
counsel to change his plea, and that the appellant had therefore
been wrongly convicted (para [5]).
Judge Molemela for the High Court Free State Division, Bloem-
fontein, emphasised that not every misdirection committed by a
trial court will be sufficiently material to warrant the setting aside
of a conviction and sentence. In this instance, the fact that the
trial magistrate had failed to record the change of plea properly,
was held not to be sufficiently serious to vitiate the guilty verdict
(para [5]). This is because the plea change occurred after the
state had already closed its case, the state had also presented a
‘solid’ case against the appellant, and the appellant had not taken
issue with the closure of the case without his having taken the
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witness stand (paras [6] [7]). Both the conviction and sentence
were consequently confirmed (para [12]).
POLICE POWERS
In Raduvha v Minister of Safety and Security & another 2016 (2)
SACR 540 (CC) paragraph [3] the court summarised police
powers as follows:
Section 205(3) of the Constitution mandates the police to ‘prevent,
combat and investigate crime, to maintain public order, to protect and
secure the inhabitants of the Republic and their property, and to
uphold and enforce the law’. In short, the police are there to ensure
that we can live, go about our daily business and sleep peacefully in
our homes at night. This is a constitutional mandate. To assist them to
carry out these onerous constitutional responsibilities for the safety
and security of our people, the law grants them a variety of powers,
including the powers to arrest and detain suspects, and enter and
search premises and people under certain circumscribed circum-
stances.
Arrest
The applicant in Raduvha v Minister of Safety and Security &
another 2016 (2) SACR 540 (CC) was fifteen years old when she
was arrested for the unlawful obstruction of police officers in the
execution of their duties in terms of section 40(1)(j) of the Criminal
Procedure Act. The factual matrix relating to this arrest and
subsequent detention dates from April 2008 when two members
of the South African Police Service (SAPS) were sent to the house
of the applicant’s mother to investigate a complaint against the
mother for contravening a protection order. When they attempted
to arrest the mother, the applicant interposed herself between her
mother and the police officers in an attempt to prevent the arrest.
The police officers regarded this as an unlawful obstruction of the
execution of their lawful duties and arrested both the applicant
and her mother. They were taken to the nearest police station,
where they were detained for approximately nineteen hours,
before being released on the next day on warning. The public
prosecutor declined to prosecute (para [7]).
Both the applicant and her mother subsequently instituted
separate civil claims against the Minister of Safety and Security
for unlawful arrest and detention, estimated future medical
expenses, legal expenses, general damages, and contumelia
(insult and scorn) (para [8]). The respondents denied liability and
relied, respectively, on section 40(1)(j) of the Criminal Procedure
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Act, in that the applicant had obstructed the police officers
wilfully whilst effecting a lawful arrest, and on section 384(1) of
the Act, in that they had acted in terms of a valid arrest warrant
when they arrested the applicant’s mother (para [9]). This case
before the Constitutional Court only related to the claim of the
applicant, as her mother had since died. The South Gauteng
High Court, Johannesburg, in Raduvha & another v Minister of
Safety and Security (cases 41997/2008 and 41998/2008, 7August
2013) dismissed the applicant’s claim for damages and found
that her arrest and detention had indeed been lawful, and her
appeal, Raduvha & another v Minister of Safety and Security
(cases 41997/2008 and 41998/2008, 17 April 2015), failed. The
applicant’s petition to the Supreme Court of Appeal also failed
(para [1]).
Before the Constitutional Court, it was argued on behalf of the
applicant that even if the police officers were authorised to arrest
her under section 40(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act, her arrest
was nonetheless unlawful and irrational as the statutory provision
gives members of the SAPS a discretion to arrest. In exercising a
discretion as to whether a summary arrest is justified, police
officials must, therefore, consider the prevailing circumstances
(para [16]). Particularly important in this instance was the fact that
the applicant was a minor and her best interests had, therefore, to
take paramount importance both in the exercise of this discretion,
and in terms of section 28(2) of the Constitution of the Republic of
South Africa, 1996, (the Constitution) (para [17]). Moreover, in
terms of section 28(1)(g) of the Constitution, a child may only be
detained as a measure of last resort, and in this case, the
applicant could easily have been left in the care and custody of
her father who was present both during her arrest and during her
detention at the police cells (para [19]).
Justice Bosielo, writing for the majority of the Constitutional
Court, noted the importance of this case in the context of the
police power to arrest and detain suspects under section 40 of
the Criminal Procedure Act, and the rights of a child as per
section 28 of the Constitution. In fact, it was observed that this
was the first case in which the Constitutional Court had the
opportunity to deal expressly with a case involving the arrest and
detention of a child (para [32]). The Constitutional Court con-
firmed that the provisions of section 40(1) of the Criminal Proce-
dure Act relating to the power of police officers to effect an arrest
in the absence of a warrant, is a discretionary power which
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‘requires police officers to weigh and consider the prevailing
circumstances and decide whether an arrest is necessary’ (para
[42]). It was held that this is a fact-specific enquiry that depends
on the unique circumstances of every case (para [42]). In
considering whether the two arresting officers in this case had
exercised their discretion and done so properly, the Constitu-
tional Court agreed with the applicant that the arresting officers
had not duly take into consideration the applicant’s best interests
as a child in terms of section 28 of the Constitution (para [48]).
Regarding the police officers’ testimony in this regard, it was
observed that they had revealed ‘a lack of knowledge and
appreciation . . . of their constitutional obligation when arresting a
child to consider her best interests as demanded by section
28(2)’ (para [51]). It also transpired that the police officers did not
consider the crucial fact that the applicant was no danger to
them, and also did not attempt to flee or cause any physical harm
or damage. The applicant was also near her parental home and
her father was present at the time of her arrest and during her
detention at the police station (para [52]).
In finding that the applicant’s arrest and detention were in
violation of her constitutional rights in terms of sections 28(2) and
28(1)(g) of the Constitution, Bosielo AJ stated that ‘an arrest of a
child should be resorted to when the facts are such that there is
no other less invasive way of securing the attendance of such a
child before a court’ (para [58]). This does not mean that children
may never be the subject of an arrest, but it demands a more
child-sensitive criminal justice system that reflects the values
underpinning the Constitution.
In Dlamini v Minister of Safety and Security 2016 (2) SACR 655
(GJ), the issue was whether it could be said that a police officer
had exercised his discretion properly in arresting the appellant
on allegations of domestic violence without first having con-
ducted a further investigation, in order to verify the truth of the
allegations in the statement made by the appellant’s wife (para
[15]). In considering whether the appellant’s arrest was lawful,
Van Oosten J for the High Court Gauteng Local Division, Johan-
nesburg, emphasised that the constitutionality of an arrest will
always depend on the factual circumstances of the case, and in
the context of allegations of domestic violence, members of the
SAPS are obliged to perform their duties and exercise their
powers in terms of the Domestic Violence Act 116 of 1998, as well
as National Instruction 7 of 1999 issued by the National Commis-
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sioner of Police pursuant to section 18(3) of the Act (paras [16]
[17]). The objective of the Domestic Violence Act is to ‘afford the
victims of domestic violence the maximum protection from domes-
tic abuse that the law can provide’, and the provisions of
paragraph 7(1) of the National Instruction ‘impose a duty on
members of the SAPS to render assistance to victims of domestic
violence by receiving and investigating the complaint (paras [17]
[18]). Judge van Oosten also held that ‘[a]s a general rule, and
depending on the circumstances of each case, it cannot be
expected of a reasonable police officer in these circumstances to
conduct a further investigation’ (para [19]). The purpose of the
arrest in this case was to bring the appellant before a court and,
once arrested, the appellant would have been entitled to exercise
all the rights enjoyed by an arrested person. It was not, therefore,
for the arresting officer in this case to conduct a hearing before
effecting the arrest (para [19]).
Search and seizure
Section 11(1)(a) and (g) of the Drugs and Drug Trafficking Act
140 of 1992 empowers police officials to enter or board and
search premises, vehicles, vessels, or aircraft, and to search any
container or other thing, if reasonable grounds exist to suspect
that an offence under the Act has been, or is about to be,
committed at any time by means of or in respect of any
scheduled substance, drug, or property. Upon conducting such
a search, police officials are also empowered to seize anything
which is connected with, or can provide proof of, a contravention
of a provision of the Act. In Minister of Police & others v Kunjana
2016 (2) SACR 473 (CC), the Constitutional Court confirmed a
declaration made by the High Court, Western Cape Division,
Cape Town, in Kunjana v Minister of Police & others (case
9073/2015 [2015] ZAWCHC 198, 3 December 2015), declaring
these provisions constitutionally invalid.
While members of the SAPS also have many other statutory
powers to conduct search and seizure operations, either by way
of a warrant or without, Mhlantla J, writing for the majority of the
Constitutional Court, explained that the powers conferred under
section 11(1)(a) and (g) of the Drugs and Drug Trafficking Act
were too broad, as it allowed for warrantless searches to be
conducted even where there was no urgency (para [11]). The
impugned provisions also do not circumscribe the time, place, or
manner in which the searches and seizures can be conducted
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(para [21]), and allow for police officials to seize ‘anything’
connected with a contravention of a provision of the Drugs and
Drug Trafficking Act (para [22]). The Constitutional Court also
agreed with the applicants’ submission that the impugned provi-
sions leave police officials without sufficient guidelines by which
to conduct the inspection within legal limits (para [23]). And,
although the effective investigation and prosecution of drug-
related offences do sometimes require that the rights of individu-
als be limited to preserve the integrity of evidentiary material, the
fundamental problem with section 11(1)(a) and (g) of the Drugs
and Drug Trafficking Act was that it allowed police officials to
‘escape the usual rigours of obtaining a warrant in all cases,
including those cases where urgent action is not required and the
delay occasioned in obtaining a warrant will not result in the items
or evidence sought being lost or destroyed’ (paras [20] [25]).
With regard to searches without a warrant, it was also noted that
constitutionally adequate safeguards must exist to justify circum-
stances where a search and seizure operation without a warrant
would be both necessary and reasonable (para [30]).
Given that there were less restrictive measures available to
achieve the purpose of the Drugs and Drug Trafficking Act, the
Constitutional Court concluded that the power conferred in
section 11(1)(a) and (g) of the Act was in violation of citizens’
rights to privacy protected under section 14 of the Constitution,
and which specifically includes the rights not to have
(a) their person or home searched;
(b) their property searched;
(c) their possessions seized; or
(d) the privacy of their communications infringed.
Contrary to the usual position that a confirmation of constitu-
tional invalidity has retrospective effect, Justice Mhlantla ordered
that this declaration of invalidity operate purely prospectively so
as to avoid any dislocation to the administration of justice and to
ensure a smooth transition from the old to the new (paras [33]
[36]; S v Zuma & others 1995 (2) SA 642 (CC)).
THE CRIMINAL JURISDICTION OF HIGH COURTS
In South Africa, the power to institute criminal proceedings
vests in the National ProsecutingAuthority the (the NPA) (s 179(2)
of the Constitution; National Prosecuting Authority Act 32 of
1998). The various Directors of Public Prosecution (DPP) and
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Deputy Directors of Public Prosecution (DDPP) are furthermore
responsible – under the control and direction of the National
Director of Public Prosecutions – for instituting proceedings in the
divisions for which they are responsible and in which area of
jurisdictions the offences were allegedly committed and investi-
gated. In addition, a decision to prosecute an accused in a
particular division of the High Court is also subject to that court
having jurisdiction over the particular case. Other statutory
provisions relating to a court’s jurisdiction include section 110(1)
of the Criminal Procedure Act which provides for instances where
an accused has entered a plea to the charges against him or her,
but has not entered a plea that the particular court lacks
jurisdiction. If it indeed appears that the court in question has no
jurisdiction, then that court shall, in terms of this provision of the
Criminal Procedure Act, be deemed to have jurisdiction in
respect of the offence in question. Section 21(1) and (2) of the
Superior Courts Act 10 of 2013 are also relevant. Section 21(1)
provides that a division of the High Court has jurisdiction over all
persons residing or being in that division, and over all causes
arising and all offences triable within that division’s area of
jurisdiction, as well as any other matter of which it may, according
to law, take cognisance (para [5]). And section 21(2) of the Act
endows a division of the High Court with jurisdiction over any
person residing or being outside its area of jurisdiction, but who is
joined as a party to any cause in relation to which the court has
jurisdiction, or who, in terms of a third-party notice, becomes a
party to such a cause (para [5]).
A case in point is S v Porritt & another 2016 (2) SACR 700 (GJ)
in which the two accused applied for declaratory orders for the
proceedings against them to be postponed for hearing in Pieter-
maritzburg, and for any offences contained in the indictment
which were allegedly committed in Johannesburg, to be centra-
lised to the High Court sitting in Pietermaritzburg (para [1]). All the
charges in the original indictment were alleged to have occurred
within the jurisdiction of the High Court Gauteng Local Division,
Johannesburg (para [9]). And, while the second accused had
since relocated to Knysna, she remained a director of the
company which was the registered owner of her residential
property in Johannesburg, she continued regularly to pay rates
and taxes on the property, and she remained with Porritt, her
co-accused, the contact persons with the company responsible
for providing security at the property (para [9]).
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In November 2010, the then NDPP directed, in terms of section
111 of the Criminal Procedure Act, that 74 of the offences with
which the accused were charged and which were allegedly
committed at or near Pietermaritzburg within the area of juris-
diction of the Director of Public Prosecutions of the KwaZulu-
Natal High Court, also be tried, together with the other charges
brought before the South Gauteng High Court, by the latter court
(para [11]). But on 24 May 2016, the state formally gave notice
that it was withdrawing all the charges relating to the offences
allegedly committed in Pietermaritzburg (para [13]). The accused,
however, disputed that with the withdrawal of the 74 counts, all
the other offences with which they had been charged, arose
within the jurisdiction of the South Gauteng High Court (para
[14]). And further, that their ‘constitutional right to a fair trial was
compromised if the trial was to proceed in Johannesburg’ (para
[16]). With regard to the latter submission, they specifically
pointed to the high cost they would incur if a lengthy trial were to
be conducted in Johannesburg, the impracticality of having to
prepare for and participate in such a trial away from where the
bulk of documentary evidence that they may need was located,
and the emotionally debilitating effect of being away from home
and family for protracted periods (para [36]).
Spilg J for the High Court of South Africa, Gauteng Local
Division, Johannesburg, commenced his judgment on juris-
diction by restating the basic principle (para [2])
. . . a court does not initiate the selection of the forum where a case is
to be tried. Its function in so far as jurisdiction is concerned is to
determine, in case of a challenge, whether the party initiating the
proceedings (ie the dominus litis) has selected the correct forum. A
state may, however, confer on the court a power to transfer or re-direct
the case to another jurisdiction.
In addition to this, the common-law principle for determining
the jurisdiction of a court requires that heed be had to when the
proceedings were instituted, and the jurisdiction so determined
does not then change, even if the jurisdictional ground subse-
quently ceases to exist (para [7]; Thermo Radiant Oven Sales
(Pty) Ltd v Nelspruit Bakeries (Pty) Ltd 1969 (2) SA 295 (A);
Mamase & others v S 2010 (1) SACR 121 (SCA)).
Therefore, in considering all the evidence presented by both
the accused and the prosecution in this case, Judge Spilg found
that the accused were not precluded from pleading under
section 106(1)(f) of the Criminal Procedure Act that the High
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Court of South Africa, Gauteng Local Division, Johannesburg,
had no jurisdiction to try the accused for the offences with which
they were being charged (para [62]). However, with regard to the
argument presented on behalf of the accused in this matter, that
their constitutional right to a fair trial would be infringed should the
case proceed in Johannesburg and not be centralised in Pieter-
maritzburg, it was held that they had failed to satisfy the court of
any prejudice they would suffer under section 35 of the Constitu-
tion (para [61]). The accused had a residence in Johannesburg
which they could use for the duration of the trial there (paras
[37]-[44]). They had, by that time, had ample opportunity to
consider the documents on which the state would rely, and they
should, therefore, have been in a position to locate the relevant
documentary evidence needed for their defence and have this
ready for a trial in Johannesburg (paras [45]-[48]). And, while the
accused could not anticipate every eventuality, they would be
able to apply for an adjournment once the trial started, in order to
locate documents if and when necessary (para [49]). Finally, with
regard to their submission that they would suffer physical and
psychological strain being away from their homes and family for
long periods, it was held that both accused had failed to show
how this would infringe on their right to a fair trial (paras
[45]-[57]).
UNREASONABLE DELAYS IN TRIALS
The appellant inMadiba v Director: Public Prosecutions Northern
Cape (case CA&R155/2015 [2016] ZANCHC 30, 3 June 2016),
along with five co-accused, faced several charges relating to
fraud and corruption. She first appeared in the magistrate’s court
on 17 November 2011 when the matter was referred to the High
Court, Northern Cape Division, Kimberley, for trial (para [1]). After
many postponements and delays, on 30 January 2015, when the
matter was again postponed to 12 February 2016, the appellant
applied for a permanent stay of prosecution (para [2]). It was
argued on the appellant’s behalf that even if a permanent stay of
proceedings was not ordered, that the court should strike the
criminal case against the appellant from the roll. The prosecution,
in turn, submitted that they were not to blame for the delays in the
proceedings, and that even if the court were to find that the
delays were unreasonable, a permanent stay of prosecution
against the appellant would not be appropriate, and that the court
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should rather refuse a further postponement of the criminal
proceedings as a less drastic remedy. It was submitted that this
would then leave the prosecution with the option of temporarily
withdrawing the charges against the appellant (para [3]).
On 21 August 2015, Lever AJ dismissed the appeal and held
that a permanent stay of the prosecution against the appellant
would indeed not be appropriate under the circumstances (para
[4]). The appellant appealed this decision, contending that the
court did not consider less drastic remedies such as refusing a
further postponement of the criminal proceedings, or striking the
criminal proceedings from the roll (para [5]). In granting the
appeal, Lever AJ indicated that it was his understanding of the
relevant statutory provisions that only the court before which the
criminal proceedings are pending, ie the court a quo, could
consider making these orders (para [8]).
Section 342A of the Criminal Procedure Act empowers a court
before which criminal proceedings are pending, to investigate
any delay in the completion of the proceedings, which appears to
be unreasonable and which could cause substantial prejudice to
the prosecution, the accused, or any other party involved. If the
court finds that the completion of the proceedings is indeed
being delayed unreasonably, it may issue any order as it deems
fit to eliminate the delay or prejudice. Oliver J, writing for the
majority of the High Court Northern Cape, Kimberley, explained
that ‘the presence of the particular pending criminal proceedings
before a court is a jurisdictional requirement for the exercise by
that court of the powers provided for in terms of this provision’
(para [15]). The appellant’s application for a permanent stay of
proceedings also did not remove the case from the court a quo
and make it a case pending before the High Court. The appellant
was still jointly charged with five other co-accused in a criminal
proceeding which stood postponed to February 2016 (para [18]).
Therefore, the submission made on behalf of the appellant that
the reference to ‘court’ in section 342A of the Criminal Procedure
Act ought to ‘be interpreted generously, and in the spirit of
leaning towards the protection of the fundamental rights of an
accused person, to mean any judge of the particular division of
the High Court, and therefore not necessarily the court before
which the trial is to take place’, was not accepted (para [22]).How-
ever, whether this case was indeed pending before the court a
quo was a matter that both the legal counsel for the defence and
the prosecution assumed, without considering the fact that the
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appellant and her co-accused had not yet even been arraigned
or indicted (paras [12] [24]).
THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN SECTION 77(6) AND 78(6) OF THE
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ACT 51 OF 1977
In S v Mthimkhulu (case 12/16 [2016] ZAECBHC 4, 5 April
2016), Judge Hartle for the High Court Eastern Cape Division,
Bhisho, revisited, in a review judgment, the difference between
sections 77(6) and 78(6) of the Criminal Procedure Act.
The accused in this matter was declared a state patient in
terms of section 77(6) of Chapter 13 of the Criminal Procedure
Act after it had been found that he was fit to stand trial, but was
suffering from a mental illness or intellectual disability that
excluded his being held criminally responsible for the alleged
offence of murder (para [3]). This, however, was incorrect, and
the matter ought to have been dealt with in terms of section 78(6)
of the Criminal ProcedureAct. While the accused in this case was
referred for psychiatric observation in terms of both sections 77
and 78 of theAct, it was clear from the psychiatric report received
that he ‘was able to follow court proceedings so as to make a
proper defence but he was found, at the time of the commission
of the alleged offence, to be unable to appreciate the wrongful-
ness of the act in question’ (para [8]). In terms of the psychiatric
report, the panel of mental health professionals recommended
that the accused be declared a state patient at Fort England
Hospital in accordance with the provisions of section 42 of the
Mental Health Care Act 17 of 2002 (para [8]).
The correct procedure was, therefore, for the magistrate to
make a finding under section 77(5) of the Criminal ProcedureAct,
that the accused was capable of understanding the proceedings
so as to make a proper defence, and to then continue by asking
the accused to plead to the charge. The accused would then
have had the opportunity to plead not guilty by reason of mental
defect (paras [15] [16]). Given that this plea would not have
placed the findings of the panel in dispute in terms of section
78(3) of the Act, the court could have proceeded to make a
finding as recommended and in terms of section 78(6)(a) of the
Act. This would entail the court finding the accused not guilty on
the charge and declaring him a state patient in terms of the
Mental Health Care Act 17 of 2002.
This important difference between sections 77 and 78 of the
Criminal Procedure Act – where section 77 deals with the
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capacity of an accused to understand proceedings, and section
78 deals with an accused’s criminal responsibility and any effect
that a mental illness or defect may have thereon – was also
considered in S v Pedro 2015 (1) SACR 42 (WCC). Also see S v
SN 2016 (1) SACR 404 (GP) on section 77 of the Criminal
Procedure Act, and Chauke v S 2016 (1) SACR 408 (SCA)
generally, on sections 77, 78 and 79 of the Act. See In Re JY 2016
(1) SACR 399 (KZP) for a discussion of the interaction between
the provisions of theMental Health CareAct and section 77(6)(a)(ii)
of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977.
SUPERIOR COURTS ACT 10 OF 2013: REFERRING A DECISION ON AN
APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL FOR RECONSIDERATION
Section 17(2)(f) of the Superior Courts Act 10 of 2013 empow-
ers the President of the Supreme Court of Appeal, whether of his
or her own accord, or on an application filed within one month of a
decision made by the Supreme Court of Appeal, to grant or
refuse leave to appeal, and as the case may be, to refer the
decision to the court for reconsideration and, if necessary,
variation. Important, however, is that the President of the Supreme
Court of Appeal can only exercise this power in exceptional
circumstances, and what constitutes exceptional circumstances
will depend on the merits of each case (R v Maihlome 1913 AD
133; R v Kgolane & others 1959 (4) SA 483 (A)).
In Ntlanyeni v S 2016 (1) SACR 581 (SCA), Judge Dambuza,
writing for the majority of the Supreme Court of Appeal, held that
there is no time limit for the President to refer, mero motu, a
decision to grant or refuse leave to appeal, to the court for
reconsideration in terms of this statutory provision (para [6]).
Judge Dambuza explained that
[t]he President’s mero motu authority under section 17(2)(f) is not
time-bound. . . . In the ordinary course of events the President will only
become aware of the circumstances in an application for leave to
appeal when his or her attention is drawn thereto. In this case the
unfortunate circumstances in the applicant’s application did not come
to the attention of the President so that he could determine whether he
should exercise his powers under section 17(2)(f) of the Act mero
motu, until he received the applicant’s application. [And despite this
application having been filed outside the prescribed time limit, Judge
Dambuza JA] . . . was satisfied that had his [the President’s] attention
been drawn thereto, other than through this application, he would
have done so. It is apparent from the reasons given by the President of
this court that he was satisfied that the refusal of leave to appeal to the
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applicant alone within the context of the merits of the case and the
mishandling of the applicant’s application for leave to appeal consti-
tuted exceptional circumstances (para [6]).
Thus, the fact that the applicant in this case brought his
application ten months after refusal of leave to appeal was, in the
circumstances before the court, irrelevant (para [6]).
Also see Malele v S; Ngobeni & others v S (case 724/16 [2016]
ZASCA115, 13 September 2016) andGwababa v S (case 1290/16
[2016] ZASCA 200, 7 December 2016).
THE NATIONAL PROSECUTING AUTHORITY OF SOUTH AFRICA
Section 179 of the Constitution provides for the establishment
of a single national prosecuting authority, structured in terms of
the National Prosecuting Authority Act 32 of 1998. This single
national prosecuting authority has the exclusive power to institute
and conduct criminal proceedings in the Republic. (Although it
can be noted that the common-law right to institute a private
prosecution remains intact and is unaffected by this legislative
framework.) In the discussion below, important cases for the
period under review and relating to the duties and powers of
the national prosecuting authority will be considered.
Pre-trial disclosure of material evidence
Du Toit v The Magistrate & others 2016 (2) SACR 112 (SCA)
concerned whether the common-law duty of the prosecution to
disclose all material evidence against an accused extends to
pornographic material involving children. The accused in this
case was charged with the possession of child pornography in
contravention of the Films and Publications Act 65 of 1996, and
sought an order from the presiding magistrate that the prosecu-
tion be directed to furnish him with copies of the images said to
constitute the offence charged (para [3]). The accused claimed
that he was entitled, without more, to be provided with copies of
the images which were alleged to constitute child pornography.
He also refused to take up the prosecutor’s offer of disclosure by
private viewing – ‘the prosecutor, who until then had objected to
reproducing the images and furnishing copies thereof to the
defence, offered to put arrangements in place for him, his legal
representatives and any expert for the defence to view the
images at an office at either the local police station or the court’
(para [3]).
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Both the trial magistrate and Ponnan JA, writing for the majority
of the Supreme Court of Appeal, found the arrangement pro-
posed by the prosecution to be ‘sufficient/adequate’ (para [4]).
Judge Ponnan relied on the Canadian Supreme Court decision in
R v Stinchcombe [1991] 3 SCR 326, 18 CRR (3d) 210, 68 CCC
(3d) 1 (SCC) (para [35]), in which the following principles were
set out with regard to the prosecution’s duty to disclose:
(a) Justice is better served by the elimination of surprise.
(b) The fruits of the investigation in possession of the prosecution are
not the property of the prosecution but of the public to ensure that
justice is done.
(c) The defence has no obligation to assist the prosecution and is
entitled to be adversarial.
(d) The search for the truth is advanced by disclosure of all relevant
material.
(e) The prosecution must retain a degree of discretion in respect of
these matters.
(f) The exercise of the prosecution’s discretion should be subject to
review by the court.
(g) There is a general principle that disclosure is not to be withheld if
there is a reasonable possibility that failure to disclose may
impede or may impair the accused’s right to make full answer and
defence which is a principle of fundamental justice protected
under the Constitution.
(h) And, it is undesirable to lay down fixed rules relating to disclo-
sure, instead each case must be determined on its own merits.
The Canadian Supreme Court in Stinchcombe also identified
three situations where the prosecution may properly exercise its
discretion to refuse disclosure, ‘namely if the information sought
is (a) beyond its control; (b) clearly irrelevant or (c) privileged’ (Du
Toit v The Magistrate & others 2016 (2) SACR 112 (SCA) para [8]).
Based on these principles, Judge Ponnan relied on the Consti-
tutional Court decision in Shabalala & others v Attorney-General,
Transvaal & another 1995 (2) SACR 761 (CC), and explained that
the allegation by the accused that the prosecutorial disclosure is
inadequate, is an assertion that his right ‘to make full answer and
defence’ had been infringed, a right that is afforded protection
under the Constitution (para [9]). In Shabalala (para [55]), the
Constitutional Court held that the blanket docket privilege formu-
lated in R v Steyn 1954 (1) SA 324 (A) could not survive the
‘discipline of the Constitution’, and declared that the question
was a fair trial question, rather than an access to information
question (para [9]). The Constitutional Court also stipulated that
although the entitlement to disclosure is a matter of constitutional
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right, that right is not unqualified (Shabalala paras [32]-[39]).
Mahomed DP, writing for the Constitutional Court in Shabalala
specified that
[w]hat the prosecution must therefore be obliged to do (by a proper
disclosure of as much of the evidence and material as it is able) is to
establish that it has reasonable grounds for its belief that the disclo-
sure of the information sought carries with it a reasonable risk that it
might lead to the identity of informers or the intimidation of witnesses
or the impediment of the proper ends of justice. It is an objective test.
It is not sufficient to demonstrate that the belief is held bona fide. It
must be shown that a reasonable person in the position of the
prosecution would be entitled to hold such a belief (para [55]).
Further to this Ponnan JA, writing for the majority of the
Supreme Court of Appeal in Du Toit v The Magistrate & others
2016 (2) SACR 112 (SCA), explained that a court in an enquiry
such as the present must
exercise a proper discretion by balancing the degree of risk involved
in attracting the consequences sought to be avoided by the prosecu-
tion (if access is permitted), against the degree of the risk that a fair
trial might ensue (if such access is denied). What is essentially
required is a judicial assessment of the balance of risk not wholly
unanalogous to the function which a judicial officer performs in
weighing the balance of convenience in cases pertaining to interdicts
pendente lite. Accordingly, a rather broad and flexible approach is
envisaged against which to measure the opportunity of the defence in
each particular case to present its case effectively to the court’ (para
[9]; Shabalala & others v Attorney-General, Transvaal & another 1995
(2) SACR 761 (CC) para [55]).
In the case under discussion, the best interests of the children
depicted in the images, as well as the public’s interest in ensuring
that no duplication or further distribution of these materials occur,
were regarded as paramount (paras [12] [13]). Moreover, it was
emphasised that the integrity of the administration of justice is
important, and that the prosecution should have a degree of
discretion in respect of matters of this kind, to protect the privacy
interests of members of the public, or to protect the public
interest by preventing the commission of further criminal acts
(para [16]). It was consequently concluded that the prosecution
in this case had properly exercised its discretion, consistent with
contemporary principles and values, and that it had done so on
demonstrably justifiable grounds (para [18]).
Reviewability of a decision to discontinue a prosecution
In Democratic Alliance v Acting National Director of Public
Prosecutions & others 2016 (2) SACR 1 (GP) Ledwaba DJP,
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Pretorius and Mothle JJ of the High Court Gauteng Division,
Pretoria, considered an application by the Democratic Alliance to
review, correct, and set aside the decision of the Acting NDPP to
discontinue the criminal prosecution of the current President,
Jacob Zuma.
The decision to charge and prosecute then Mr Zuma was
preceded by a protracted investigation that started in 2001 and
culminated in an application on 20 November 2007 to the then
Acting NDPP for the centralisation of charges in terms of section
111 of the Criminal Procedure Act (paras [10]-[12]). At the
beginning of December 2007, a report to this effect and in terms
of section 33 of the National Prosecuting Authority Act 32 of 1998
was submitted to the Minister of Justice and Constitutional
Development. This was followed by a conversation between the
then Minister and the Acting NDPP in which the Minister raised
concerns regarding the safety and stability of the country should
the indictment be served before the African National Congress’s
(ANC) Polokwane conference, where the new ANC leader stood
to be elected (para [34]). For this reason, the decision was taken
to delay serving the indictment and it was served only on
28 December 2007, whereafter Zuma launched an application in
terms of section 179 of the Constitution for a review of this
decision to prosecute him. While the matter was first decided in
Zuma’s favour, the Supreme Court of Appeal overturned this
ruling on 12 January 2009 (para [16]). Written and oral represen-
tations were thereafter made on behalf of Zuma to the NPAand on
1 April 2009, after the ANDPP had listened to audio recordings
of intercepted communications by the parties involved, he
announced his decision to discontinue the prosecution (para
[32]).
This decision was announced publicly on 6 April 2009 and was
based primarily on the alleged manipulation of the timing of the
envisaged service of the indictment on Zuma for political reasons
(para [39]). The gist of the decision and the grounds on which it
was based were articulated as follows (paras [39] [40]):
In the present matter, the conduct consists of the timing of the
charging of the accused . . . Even if the prosecution itself as con-
ducted by the prosecution team is not tainted, the fact [is] that
Mr McCarthy, who was head of the DSO, and was in charge of the
matter at all times and managed it almost on a daily basis, manipu-
lated the legal process for purposes outside and extraneous to the
prosecution itself. It is not so much the prosecution itself that is tainted,
but the legal process itself. McCarthy used the legal process for a
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purpose other than that which the process was designed to serve, ie
for collateral and illicit purposes. It does not matter that the team acted
properly, honestly, fairly and justly throughout. Mr McCarthy’s conduct
amounts to a serious abuse of process and offends one’s sense of
justice . . . In light of the above, I have come to the difficult conclusion
that it is neither possible nor desirable for the NPA to continue with the
prosecution of Mr Zuma . . . Let me also state for the record that the
prosecution team itself had recommended that the prosecution should
continue even if the allegations are true, and that it should be left to a
court of law to decide whether to stop the prosecution.
The applicant in this present matter, the Democratic Alliance
(DA), reacted immediately by launching the present application
for review of the decision of 7 April 2009 (para [38]). The
reviewability of a decision to discontinue a prosecution was
subsequently considered in Democratic Alliance & others v
Acting National Director of Public Prosecutions & others 2012 (3)
SA 486 (SCA) and National Director of Public Prosecutions &
others v Freedom Under Law 2014 (4) SA 298 (SCA). In both
these cases, the Supreme Court of Appeal held that a decision to
discontinue a prosecution is reviewable on the principle of
legality, and on grounds of its having been irrationally made
(Democratic Alliance & others v Acting National Director of Public
Prosecutions & others 2012 (3) SA 486 (SCA) para [23]ff;
Freedom Under Law v National Director of Public Prosecutions &
others 2014 (1) SA 254 (GNP) para [29]; and National Director of
Public Prosecutions & others v Freedom Under Law 2014 (4) SA
298 (SCA)). The rationality of such a decision involves an
evaluation of the relationship between means and ends; the link
between the means used to achieve a particular purpose, and
the purpose or end in itself (para [46]; Albutt v Centre for the
Study of Violence and Reconciliation & others 2010 (3) SA 293
(CC) paras [32] [51]). Aconsideration of rationality further involves
both substantive and procedural issues, and both the process by
which the decision was made and the decision itself must,
therefore, be rationally related (para [47]; Democratic Alliance v
President of the Republic of South Africa & others 2013 (1) SA248
(CC)). With regard to the rationality requirement, the court
concluded that while the alleged conduct by McCarthy, if proven,
constituted a serious breach of law and prosecutorial policy, the
form of censure chosen by the Acting NDPP – the discontinuation
of the prosecution against Zuma – ‘failed to demonstrate a
connection or linkage to the alleged conduct of Mr McCarthy’
(paras [52]-[54]). The Acting NDPP also disregarded, without
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giving any reasons, the recommendation by the prosecution
team that the determination of the principles of abuse of process
was an exercise for a court of law, and not an extra-judicial
pronouncement (paras [64] [65]; National Director of Public
Prosecutions v Zuma 2009 (2) SA 277 (SCA)).
Thus, the decision to discontinue the prosecution was ulti-
mately based on the alleged abuse of process that rested on
untested allegations unrelated to the trial process and the
charges against Zuma (para [71]). The decision was conse-
quently found by the judges to be irrational and should for that
reason be set aside (paras [92]-[94]).
Also see Moti v National Director of Public Prosecutions (case
6593/15 [2016] ZAGPPHC 456, 24 May 2016).
Powers of the President in terms of section 12(6)(a) of the National
Prosecuting Authority Act 32 of 1998
The applicant in Democratic Alliance v President of the Repub-
lic of South Africa & others 2016 (2) SACR 494 (WCC) sought to
have the decision of the President not to invoke the provisions of
section 12(6)(a) of the National Prosecuting Authority Act 32 of
1998 reviewed and set aside, and for the Deputy NDPP to be
suspended and an enquiry instituted into her alleged misconduct
and her fitness to hold office (para [1]). Section 12(6)(a) of the
National Prosecuting Authority Act 32 of 1998 empowers the
President of the Republic of South Africa to suspend the NDPP or
Deputy NDPP from office pending an enquiry into his or her
fitness to hold office, on the ground of, inter alia, alleged
misconduct (para [2]).
With regard to whether or not the alleged failure by the
President to invoke section 12(6)(a) of the National Prosecuting
Authority Act can be properly characterised as ‘a failure to
discharge a constitutional obligation’, Dolamo J for the High
Court Western Cape Division, Cape Town, held that the provision
‘clearly does not confer on the President an obligation to suspend
or enquire into the fitness of a DNDPP to hold office. The
Constitution only requires that national legislation be promul-
gated which must ensure that the prosecuting authority exercised
its function without fear or favour’ (para [13]). Yet, the matter
before the court involved whether the President had exercised his
powers, acquired through the provisions of section 12(6)(a) of the
National Prosecuting Authority, rationally and lawfully. It was held
that this was a matter over which the High Court had jurisdiction
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(para [13]). The respondents’ submission that the matter before
the court in this present case was lis alibi pendens, and should
for this reason be stayed pending the disposal of two other
applications before the High Court in Pretoria, was also dis-
missed (para [18]). In this regard, Judge Dolamo stated that
there are three requirements for successful reliance on a plea of
lis alibi pendens: the litigation must be between the same parties;
the cause of action must be the same; and the same relief must
be sought in both matters (para [19]). It was clear that none of
these three requirements had been met and, despite a court
having a discretion to stay matters where not all of these
requirements have been met, Judge Dolamo held that this matter
did not warrant the exercise of such a discretion (para [19]).
The court then considered all the facts and circumstances
available to the President and which he had considered in
exercising his power in terms of section 12(6)(a) of the National
Prosecuting Authority Act (paras [25]-[69]). The question here
was ultimately whether the President, equipped with all this
information and the surrounding circumstances, had exercised
his power in terms of section 12(6)(a) of the Act not to suspend
the Deputy NDPP or hold an inquiry into her fitness to hold office,
in a rational and lawful manner (para [70]). Dolamo J agreed with
the respondents that the responsibility entrusted to a President in
terms of section 12(6)(a) of the National Prosecuting Authority Act
goes beyond ensuring that the NDPP and the Deputy NDPP are fit
and proper people to lead the NPA. The President must also
ensure that this important institution supporting the South African
democracy ‘is allowed to function properly and without undue
interruption which may be brought about by unwarranted suspen-
sions of key personnel’ (para [88]). In addition, ‘[u]nwarranted
suspension brought about by untested allegations may disrupt
the smooth running of the institution’ (para [88]). It was held that in
this matter, the President had opted for a ‘cautious approach
dictated by the circumstances’ (para [91]).
Judge Dolamo also stated that even if he was convinced that
the President should have decided otherwise, the court was not
at liberty to intervene, as judicial intervention would only be
warranted if the ‘President exercised the power bestowed upon
him by section 12(6)(a) of the National Prosecuting Authority Act
32 of 1998 in a manner manifestly at odds with the purpose for
which the power was conferred’ (para [95]). Constrained by the
separation of powers doctrine, courts will only on ‘rare occasions’
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be allowed to interfere with the constitutional powers of the
President under section 12(6)(a) of the National Prosecuting
Authority Act (para [97]).
THE INDEPENDENT POLICE INVESTIGATIVE DIRECTORATE
The Constitutional Court in McBride v Minister of Police &
another 2016 (2) SACR 585 confirmed an earlier order by the
High Court of South Africa Gauteng Division, Pretoria, declaring
several sections of the Independent Police Investigative Director-
ate Act 1 of 2011 (the IPID) inconsistent with the Constitution and
therefore invalid. These were: sections 6(3)(a) and 6(6) of the
IPID; sections 16A(1), 16B, 17(1) and 17(2) of the Public Service
Act, (Proclamation 103 of 1994); and regulation 13 of the IPID
Regulations for the Operation of the Independent Police Investi-
gative Directorate (GN R98 in GG 35018 of 10 February 2012). It
was found that these provisions were inconsistent with section
206(6) of the Constitution and therefore invalid to the extent that
they purported to authorise the Minister of Police to suspend, take
disciplinary steps pursuant to the suspension, or remove the
Executive Director of the IPID from office (para [1]).
Section 206(6) of the Constitution provides for the establish-
ment of an independent police complaints body by national
legislation. And it was in terms of this provision that the IPID was
established with the primary duty of investigating any alleged
misconduct or offence committed by a member of the SAPS.
Section 4 of the Act guarantees the independence of the IPID
from the SAPS (para [4]). However, it was argued on behalf of
McBride that the cumulative effect of the impugned provisions
did create sufficient safeguards to ensure the independence of
the IPID and its officials (para [6]). The Constitutional Court,
therefore, had to decide ‘whether, in light of the applicable
statutory framework, IPID enjoys adequate structural and opera-
tional independence, as envisaged by section 206(6) of the
Constitution, to ensure that it is effectively insulated from undue
political interference’ (para [8]).
On this question, the High Court Gauteng Division, Pretoria,
found that the independence of the IPID is expressly guaranteed
and protected under section 206(6) of the Constitution, and that
the IPID should be afforded protection similar to that which the
Constitution requires for the Directorate for the Priority Crime
Investigation (DPCI) (para [15]). In fact, the High Court held that
the IPID’s constitutionally guaranteed independence requires
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more stringent protection, because unlike the DPCI, which is
situated within the SAPS, the IPID is institutionally and functionally
independent of the SAPS (para [16]). The High Court subse-
quently concluded that: section 6(3)(a) and (6) of the Indepen-
dent Police Investigative Directorate Act 1 of 2011; sections
16A(1), 16B, 17(1) and (2) of the Public Service Act, 1994; and
regulation 13 of the IPID Regulations for the Operation of the
Independent Police Investigative Directorate (above) were incon-
sistent with section 206(6) of the Constitution due to, inter alia, the
lack of parliamentary oversight and the unilateral powers and the
sole discretion of the Minister over the Executive Director of the
IPID (para [17]). The Constitutional Court agreed with this finding
(para [44]).
IRREGULARITIES IN TERMS OF THE CHILD JUSTICE ACT 75 OF 2008
A number of irregularities that ultimately vitiated the criminal
proceedings against two minor accused occurred in S v XM &
another 2016 (1) SACR 500 (KZP).
First, the two minor accused were incorrectly diverted in terms
of the Child Justice Act 75 of 2008 for the Schedule 3 offences
they had allegedly committed (para [2]). Each of the two offenders
was charged with armed robbery and possession of an unli-
censed firearm, in contravention of Schedule 3 of the Child
Justice Act 75 of 2008, read together with the relevant provisions
of the Firearms Control Act 60 of 2000 (para [5]). Offences listed
in Schedule 3 to the Child Justice Act 75 of 2008 are regarded as
the most serious offences and the diversion of accused minors
charged with Schedule 3 offences is only possible where excep-
tional circumstances exist, and the DPP having jurisdiction has
indicated, in writing, that the matter may be diverted (paras [10]
[24]; s 52(3)(a) of the Child Justice Act 75 of 2008). This power of
the DPP can furthermore not be delegated (para [11]; s 52(3)(d)
of the Child Justice Act 75 of 2008). Given that the written
indication by the relevant DPP is a prerequisite for a diversion, it
was held that the magistrate in this case was precluded from
making a diversion order under the Child Justice Act, and that his
doing so constituted a fatal irregularity that vitiated the proceed-
ings in their entirety (para [13]).
A further irregularity was that only one child offender appeared
at a preliminary inquiry. The other minor accused was merely
added to the subsequent Child Justice Court proceedings on the
same day, without having first appeared at a preliminary inquiry
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(para [14]). In this regard, section 5(3) of the Child Justice Act is
clear that all children are required to appear at a preliminary
inquiry in terms of the general provisions of Chapter 2 of the Act.
In fact, a preliminary inquiry is generally regarded as one of the
most important steps in the judicial process involving a young
offender (paras [15] [16]). The court held (para [17]) that the
primary purpose of such an inquiry is to safeguard the basic
rights of children, and these basic rights include the right
• not to be detained, except as a measure of last resort, and if
detained, only for the shortest appropriate period of time;
• to be treated in a manner and kept in conditions that take
account of the child’s age;
• to be kept separately from adults, and to separate boys from
girls, while in detention;
• to family, parental or appropriate alternative care;
• to be protected from maltreatment, neglect, abuse or degra-
dation; and
• not to be subjected to practices that could endanger the
child’s well-being, education, physical or mental health or
spiritual, moral or social development.
The regional magistrates in presiding over the cases of these
two minor accused also failed to comply with the provisions of
section 49(2) of the Child Justice Act (paras [18]-[20] [27] [28]).
For example, if the child is not legally represented, the inquiry
magistrate must explain to him or her and the parent or other
adult or guardian present, the provisions of section 82(1) of the
Act regarding legal representation (s 29(2)(a) of the Child Justice
Act), or, if the child was not held in detention prior to the
proceeding, the inquiry magistrate may alter or extend any
conditions imposed in terms of section 24(4) of the Act, and must
also warn the child and his or her parent or other adult or
guardian, that the child must appear in a Child Justice Court on a
specified date and at a specified time and place (s 49(2)(c)(i)–(ii)
of the Child Justice Act). And finally, with regard to the diversion
option chosen by the inquiry magistrates, it was noted that as the
two minor accused had been charged with Schedule 3 offences
in terms of the Child Justice Act, the appropriate diversion option
was a level-two option and not a level-one diversion option as
selected by the inquiry magistrates and which was really only a
reporting order in terms of section 53(1)(d) of the Child Justice
Act (paras [21] [25]).
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